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Abstract 
Research on the usefulness of financial information generally focuses on the innovation 
in the information examined, such as an earnings surprise or cash flow growth. Consequently, 
prior research sheds little light on the role of the rich historical record of financial information in 
users’ decision-making. Using a sample of published restatements of earnings, we show that the 
revision of the historical pattern of earnings, distinct from the magnitude of the restatement and 
its impact on current earnings, significantly affects investors’ decisions and predicts class action 
lawsuits. Specifically, we find that restatements that eliminate or shorten histories of earnings 
growth or positive earnings have significantly more adverse effects for investor valuations and 
the likelihood of lawsuits than other restatements.  This evidence about the value-relevance of 
refreshing the historical record of earnings is pertinent to the FASB’s recent cautious expansion 
of the scope of circumstances that require a restatement of financial information in FAS 154. 
 
Keywords:  Historical record, revisions, financial information, investors’ decisions, class action 
lawsuits. 
Rewriting Earnings History 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this study we examine the unique setting of earnings restatements—the rewriting of 
earnings history—in which revisions to previously reported earnings are recognized in amended 
financial statements (rather than just disclosed in financial reports as is required, for example, for 
property-casualty insurers’ loss reserve development).1 In contrast to prior research on earnings 
restatements, which primarily focuses on the total magnitude of restatements, we examine 
restatements’ effects on the firm’s historical pattern of earnings that we expect to have 
significantly adverse implications for the firm and its investors. We predict and find that earnings 
restatements that eliminate or shorten histories of earnings growth or positive earnings trigger a 
stronger negative market reaction to the restatement announcement and increase the likelihood of 
class action lawsuits, compared to restatements which do not affect the historical pattern of 
earnings in these ways. We control in our analysis for the effects of restatements on the 
magnitudes of current and lagged earnings and for various attributes of restatements that the 
prior literature has found to be associated with investor reaction and the likelihood of class action 
lawsuits.      
This study contributes to and in certain respects marries research examining the 
consequences of earnings restatements with research examining the value-relevance of the 
historical record of financial information. The first of these strands of research shows that 
earnings restatements are relevant to investors and related to important events, such as the filing 
of class action lawsuits and changes in the cost of capital. We extend this research strand by 
showing that the elimination of past earnings growth or positive earnings patterns, as distinct 
from the magnitude of the restatement and its effect on current earnings, impacts stock prices and 
lawsuit likelihood. Thus, the rewriting of earnings history (past patterns) matters.   
With respect to the second research strand—the value-relevance of the historical record 
of financial information—we provide empirical evidence demonstrating such relevance in the 
specific context of earnings restatements.  This contribution, we believe, is of considerable 
importance because of the paucity of empirical evidence in this area.  This is due, in part, to the 
widespread belief that most users focus on current financial information and quickly lose interest 
in historical data.  Such an evidently wrong view is expressed, for example, in APB 20 (para. 
14): “Restating financial statements of prior periods may dilute public confidence in financial 
statements and may confuse those who use them.”  
Similarly, researchers typically focus on identifying and analyzing the innovation 
component of financial information, that is, the new or unexpected part of the message.2 For 
example, the large body of research on the returns–earnings relation initiated by Ball and Brown 
(1968) primarily examines the market’s reaction to unexpected earnings, and earnings 
management research mainly focuses on unexpected (or abnormal) accruals.  Researchers rarely 
attend to the rich historical record of financial report information and thus shed little light on 
users’ interpretation of that record or how new information interacts with it.3  
Our findings, in contrast, indicate that significant revisions in the historical pattern of 
earnings have important implications for the firm and its investors.  Such findings are clearly 
relevant to the renewed interest of regulators in expanding the revision of historical financial 
records, as manifested in the FASB’s issuance of FAS 154 and more generally by the substantial 
increase in the frequency of earnings restatements in recent years, many of which have been 
prompted by the SEC.     
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a conceptual 
analysis of the rewriting of financial histories.  In Section III we summarize the related research 
and discuss how our paper contributes to that research. In Section IV we outline our hypotheses 
and describe the general structure of our empirical models. In Section V we discuss the sample, 
test variables, and descriptive statistics, and in Section VI we report the empirical results for the 
returns analysis. In Section VII we present the findings of the class action lawsuit analysis, and 
Section VIII concludes the study. 
 
II. The Rewriting of Financial Histories 
How does the historical record of financial report information affect users’ decisions? 
Accounting data, like any other historical record, portray a process of development that links 
individual observations, such as financial statement line items, across time (e.g., a pattern of 
sales growth) and to external conditions and events (e.g., tax rate changes). In such a process of 
development, an individual observation, be it an earnings surprise or unexpected accruals, cannot 
be interpreted in isolation, abstracting from the history of the process or the impact of the 
observation on that history.4 For example, it has been shown that the size of accounting accruals 
varies with the life cycle of the enterprise, being relatively large for young, fast-growing 
companies and decreasing as the firm matures (Khan, 2005). In this case, the firm’s history of 
accruals contains information about its development stage and, in turn, about its current and 
expected accruals; conversely, the firm’s current accruals provide information about its stage of 
development. Accordingly, a researcher who focuses only on the relation between current 
accruals and a variable of interest, such as share returns, ignores the interactions between the 
firm’s lifecycle stage and both historical and current accruals and therefore misspecifies the true, 
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underlying relation between accruals and returns. For instance, high accruals at an early stage of 
a firm’s life cycle suggest it is making the investments required of such firms, and accordingly 
such accruals should have less adverse valuation implications than they would for a mature 
company, for which large accruals suggest earnings management. 
Similarly, since the historical records of economic data are important for the 
interpretation of new economic or social information and events, it is not surprising that such 
records are routinely revised (refreshed) to improve their usefulness. For example, 
macroeconomic data, such as gross domestic product (GDP), are periodically revised by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) in light of new information. The first estimate of quarterly 
GDP is released several days before the end of the quarter, based solely on projections of the yet 
to be realized value. This figure is revised soon after the end of the quarter with estimates based 
on sampling and other approximation techniques of the now realized, although not fully known, 
GDP value, followed by yet another revision a few months later based on realizations of certain 
estimates and refined approximations. Lastly, every five years the entire record of the national 
accounts is revised based on the best available information about the realizations of prior 
estimates. The essence of these revisions of macroeconomic data is the continuous use of new 
information to update and correct the previously published historical record. Empirical evidence 
indeed indicates that such revisions of macroeconomic data are highly relevant to decision 
makers.5
Despite the frequency and relevance of revisions of historical records in other economic 
and social contexts, with one notable exception discussed below, generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) require the restatement of earnings only in the unusual circumstances of 
identified errors or fraud.  Specifically, APB 20 requires restatements in case of “[e]rrors in 
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financial statements result from mathematical mistakes, mistakes in the application of accounting 
principles, or oversight or misuse of facts that existed at the time the financial statements were 
prepared” (para. 13). Except for a few cases (e.g., FAS 146), accounting standards do not even 
require the disclosure of revisions of accrual estimates underlying the computation of earnings. 
As summarized in FAS 16, most extant GAAP rules convey the belief that the historical record 
of financial information should reflect the estimates and projections made at the time of 
disclosure, and hence the originally published record should not be revised even when new 
information contradicts prior assumptions and projections, except in rare cases.  
Recent actions by the FASB, however, suggest that it is moving cautiously towards 
requiring firms to refresh the historical record of financial report information in a wider context. 
Most notably, FAS 154, issued in May 2005, requires firms to restate past financial statements 
for voluntary accounting changes. In the summary of this standard, the FASB states that such 
restatement will improve financial reporting by “enhancing the consistency of financial 
information between periods.” While FAS 154 constitutes a significant change from prior GAAP 
(APB 20), it still is a far cry from the more ambitious proposals by academics that firms be 
required either to restate past financial statements based on newly revealed information, or 
disclose revisions of major accrual estimates based on such information, in order to provide 
better information about firm risk (Ryan 1997), to support credible voluntary disclosures 
(Lundholm 1999), or to curb earnings manipulation (Lev 2003).  
While the empirical work in our study is limited to the specific context of restatements of 
earnings under existing accounting rules, our findings that revisions to the historical pattern of 
earnings have significant valuation implications and other consequences (lawsuits) are consistent 
with the view that accounting standards should be extended in the direction of requiring revision 
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of the historical record of earnings under a broader set of circumstances than is currently 
prescribed. This view is further supported by the fact that our findings regarding the valuation 
implications of pattern-disrupting restatements are mainly driven by sample observations in 
which the restating firm did not admit fraud. So, it is not the extreme case of fraud where 
reporting of changes in the pattern of historical earnings is critical, rather it is the more normal 
cases of inadvertent misapplication of accounting rules, whether due to managers’ insufficient 
understanding of the firm’s circumstances or to deficiencies in their accounting policies and 
systems. We elaborate on this point in the conclusion. 
 
III. Related Research  
Earnings Restatements 
It is widely recognized that earnings restatements constitute a powerful—although not 
necessarily representative—setting in which to examine the circumstances, determinants, and 
consequences of earnings management.6 The restatements/earnings management literature has 
two distinct phases: The earlier work focuses on specific cases of Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) enforcement actions (Feroz et al. 1991; Dechow et al. 1996; Bonner et al. 
1998; Beneish 1999) and accounting errors (Defond and Jiambalvo 1991), whereas the more 
recent literature (Griffin 2003; Palmrose et al. 2004; Palmrose and Scholz 2004; Hribar and 
Jenkins 2004; Anderson and Yohn 2002; Wu 2002; Richardson et al. 2003) examines multiple 
types of earnings restatements, sometimes focusing on the more frequently restated line items 
such as revenue (Callen et al. 2003) or in-process research and development costs (Dowdell and 
Press 2001; Banyi 2006). 
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Three studies—Palmrose et al. (2004; hereafter PRS), Anderson and Yohn (2002; 
hereafter AY), and Wu (2003)—examine the short-window market reaction around 
announcements of various types of earnings restatements, reporting that the mean and median 
reactions to such restatements are significantly negative. For example, Wu documents a three-
day mean cumulative abnormal return of –11.2%.7 Wu also reports a significantly negative 
return drift beginning at least 169 trading days prior to the restatement announcement, as well as 
a post-announcement negative return drift ending at least 85 days after announcement. These 
three studies report that the market reaction is significantly positively associated with the 
magnitude of the restatement, and that the market reaction is significantly more negative for 
cases which involve revenue, core earnings, or admissions of fraud than for other restatements.8  
Wu (2003) reports that the market reaction is significantly more negative for restatements in 
which the amount of the restatement is not disclosed at the initial announcement and 
significantly less negative for restatements enforced by the SEC,9 whereas PRS report that the 
market reaction is significantly more negative for restatements enforced by the firm’s auditor 
than for other restatements. 
Of the studies investigating the market reaction to earnings restatements, only PRS 
(2004) examine a variable that captures an effect of the restatement on the history of earnings, 
which is our primary concern. PRS examine the number of past years of earnings that are 
restated, but find that this variable is insignificantly associated with returns.10
Researchers also examine the association of earnings restatements with other capital 
market, analyst forecast, and managerial compensation variables, documenting the pervasive 
effects of restatements.11 Specifically, Anderson and Yohn (2002) and Wu (2003) report that 
earnings restatements lead to a decline in regression-derived earnings response coefficients, 
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Hribar and Jenkins (2004) find that restatements trigger increases in cost of capital, and Kravet 
and Shevlin (2006) report that restatements yield an increased factor loading on information risk 
in pricing models; all of these studies suggest that restatements increase investors’ uncertainty. 
Palmrose et al. (2004) and Hribar and Jenkins (2004) document that restatements lead to 
significant decreases in analyst earnings forecasts and in the dispersion of the forecasts, and 
Griffin (2003) reports that informed investors, such as corporate insiders, short sellers, and 
institutional investors, sell stock prior to earnings restatements.12 Agrawal and Chadha (2004) 
report that earnings restatements are more likely when the CEO belongs to the founding family 
and less likely for firms whose boards or audit committees have an independent director with 
financial expertise. Burns and Kedia (2004) report that restatements are particularly large for 
firms where the CEO’s options portfolio is sensitive to stock price. Finally, Kedia and Philippon 
(2006) find that restatements are preceded by a period of excessive investment, employee hiring, 
and managerial exercise of options, and are followed by sharp disinvestments and employee 
firing. Desai et al. (2006) add that restatements lead to managerial turnover. 
Palmrose and Scholz (2004) examine the association of restatements with the filing of 
class action lawsuits, and report that the probability of a lawsuit increases for restatements that 
involve core earnings, impact a large number of financial accounts, or are the result of fraud.13 
They further report that the probability of a lawsuit is positively associated with the magnitude of 
the restatement, as well as with firm size, a recent initial public offering, prior sales growth, and 
the market reaction to the restatement announcement. 
Three recent earnings restatement studies examine various aspects of either the historical 
record of originally reported earnings or the revision of that record—our focus of analysis. First, 
PRS find that the number of years restated is not associated with the market reaction to the 
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announcement. Second, Richardson et al. (2003) report that restating firms are more likely to 
have attempted to maintain a string of consecutive quarters of earnings growth and positive 
earnings surprises prior to the restatement than non-restating firms. This finding bears directly on 
the motivation and structure of our study, with an important difference; Richardson et al. focus 
on the original series of pre-restatement earnings, while we focus on the impact of the 
restatement on the historical record (eliminating a pattern of earnings growth or positive 
earnings). A restatement following earnings growth or positive earnings patterns may, or may 
not, reverse those patterns. In fact, a substantial number of restatements in our sample (14%) had 
a positive effect on prior earnings, thereby enhancing previously published growth patterns. So, 
there is a significant difference between the consideration of trends and patterns in the originally-
reported earnings, and our focus on disruptions in those patterns. The third related study is 
Callen et al. (2003), who report that firms with histories of losses and a high likelihood of future 
losses are more likely to manipulate and subsequently restate revenues than are profitable firms. 
While Callen et al.’s findings imply that the history of earnings has a role in the occurrence and 
nature of restatements, their examination is restricted to loss firms for which revenues are 
substantially more value-relevant than earnings. In contrast, our study examines the broad 
sample of firms restating earnings.  
 Thus, while the historical record of earnings for restating firms has received some 
research attention, our main contribution lies in the sharp focus on the effect of restatements that 
significantly change the pattern of historical earnings—that eliminate previously reported 
earnings growth or positive earnings—on returns to investors and the probability of a lawsuit.  
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Research on the Relevance of the Historical Record of Earnings 
 
The second strand of research relevant to our study is the work on the impact of the 
historical record on the information content of earnings. This research has three dimensions. 
First, Antle et al. (1994) show analytically that the information content of earnings, measured in 
terms of its association with contemporaneous returns, depends on the history of earnings and 
other variables when earnings either complement or substitute for the historical variables. 
Relatedly, they show that the full information content of earnings need not be manifested 
immediately, but may require future complementary information to be revealed in order to 
unlock the information conveyed by earnings. 
Second, Lundholm (2003) constructs a model in which information on the ex post 
accuracy of prior accrual estimates motivates credible voluntary disclosures and thereby enriches 
the overall information environment. This provides theoretical support for Lundholm’s (1999) 
proposal to require managers to routinely report on the comparison of estimates underlying 
financial information with subsequent realizations, creating ex ante disincentives to manipulate 
estimates. Other researchers have proposed that firms be required either to disclose or to restate 
past financial statements for revisions of major accrual estimates in order to provide better 
information about firm risk (Ryan 1997) and to curb earnings manipulation (Lev 2003). In this 
study, we provide empirical support for these proposals by demonstrating the relevance to 
investors and other users of financial reports of revisions of the historical record of earnings. 
Lastly, Barth et al. (1999) document that the market applies higher pricing multiples to 
the earnings of firms with persistent histories of earnings growth. Relatedly, Barth et al. (1999), 
Myers and Skinner (2002), and Skinner and Sloan (2002) find that earnings multiples, market 
values, and stock returns of growth companies are more adversely affected by an earnings 
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disappointment than are returns of no-growth firms.  These findings indicating the relevance of 
the historical record of earnings to the interpretation of current information also motivate our 
following hypotheses.   
 
IV. HYPOTHESES AND EMPIRICAL MODELS 
We hypothesize that earnings restatements that significantly change the historical pattern 
of earnings by eliminating or shortening histories of consecutive positive earnings or of 
earnings growth have more adverse consequences for investors (as reflected in stock returns) 
than do other restatements, and that such history-changing restatements increase the likelihood 
of class action lawsuits filed against the restating firms. We chose stock returns and the filing 
of class action lawsuits as dependent variables because they are major consequences of 
financial reporting, and they constitute the primary decision-oriented variables examined in the 
restatements literature. 
We note here an issue that arises in making and testing these hypotheses. The impact of 
pattern-changing restatements on stock returns (and indirectly on lawsuits) depends on the 
statistical properties of the originally reported and restated earnings numbers, and, on what the 
market knows about these properties. For example, if both originally reported and restated 
earnings are known to follow a random walk, then the historical pattern of earnings will not 
affect stock returns after controlling for the levels of originally reported and restated current 
earnings. However, given the extreme circumstances of earnings restatements and the often 
troubled nature of restating firms, we do not expect either the originally reported or restated 
earnings to follow a random walk.14  
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The structure of our primary empirical models is as follows. In the stock returns model 
we regress (using pooled OLS estimation) beta-adjusted returns for the three-day window 
around the restatement announcement on: (a) indicator variables for restatements that eliminate 
or shorten histories of consecutive years of positive earnings or of earnings growth, (b) an 
indicator variable for restatements that affect the current year’s earnings (prior research does 
not distinguish these restatements from those that affect only prior years’ earnings), (c) the 
magnitudes of the effects of the restatement on current year’s earnings and on earnings in all 
prior years combined (prior research examines the sum of these variables), and (d) various 
indicator variables for attributes of restatements and restating firms that prior research has 
found to be significantly associated with announcement returns. We thus separate in the returns 
tests the effects of the restatement on the historical pattern of earnings from the restatement’s 
effects on current earnings. In the class action lawsuit analysis, we regress (using pooled logit 
estimation) an indicator variable for the filing of a class action lawsuit following a restatement 
on the explanatory variables used in the returns analysis as well as on stock returns 
contemporaneous with the restatement announcement as in Palmrose and Scholz (2004), and 
on returns prior to the restatement announcement. 
 
V. SAMPLE, VARIABLES, AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Our sample consists of 1032 earnings restatements reported in amended Form 10-Q/A 
(quarterly) or Form 10-K/A (annual) filed by U.S.-listed firms during 1977–2002.15 The sample 
is based on a detailed search of the LexisNexis Business, Dow Jones Interactive Publications 
Library, and ABI/Inform databases, using the keywords “restatement,” “restate,” “restated,” 
“restates,” and “restating.” The sample does not include restatements due to stock splits or 
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dividends, discontinued operations, mergers and acquisitions, changes of accounting periods, and 
applications of new accounting principles or policies. As reported in Table 1, Panel A, from this 
initial sample we drop 19 observations that do not have identifying information, such as a perm 
number, cusip, or cnum, along with an additional 127 observations that are not on CRSP or are 
missing required CRSP data, and an additional 65 observations that are not on Compustat or are 
missing Compustat data. This yields our final sample of 821 restatements made by 750 distinct 
firms. We analyze this set of restatements below.  
Of the 750 distinct firms, 64 have two restatements, three firms have three restatements, 
and one has four restatements in our original sample of 1032 restatements, although two of these 
multiple-restatement observations do not survive to the ultimate sample of 821 restatements. We 
do not distinguish single- and multiple-restatement observations in the tabulated analyses, 
although in untabulated analyses we observed no significant differences between these types of 
observations, as discussed with the other specification analyses in Sections VI and VII.     
Our data include the date of the initial public announcement of a restatement and the date 
of the initial disclosure of the amounts of the restatement; the latter date may be the same as or 
follow the former date. Consistent with prior research, we examine only the market reaction 
around the restatement announcement. For each reporting period affected by the restatement, we 
obtained the amounts of the originally reported earnings and the restated earnings, defining the 
difference (restated minus originally reported) as the amount of the restatement for that period. 
The indicator variable nonumbers takes a value of one for restatements whose amounts are not 
disclosed at the initial announcement (and, as for all other dichotomous indicator variables, a 
value of zero otherwise). Consistent with Wu’s (2003) findings, we expect restatement 
announcements that do not disclose the amount of the restatement to have more adverse 
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implications for investors (in part due to larger uncertainty) than restatement announcements 
with the amount indicated. As reported in Table 2, Panel A, there are 269 observations in the 
sample for which nonumbers takes a value of one, constituting 33% of the observations. Also 
reported in Table 1, Panel A, the amount of the restatement is never disclosed for six 
observations (1% of the sample), in which case we set this amount to zero rather than eliminate 
the observation; this has no substantive effect on our results. As evident in Wu (2003) and 
reported in our Table 1, Panel B, the frequency of earnings restatements has risen over time, with 
453 (55%) of the observations occurring in the last five years of the 26-year sample period.16
Earnings restatements may pertain to relatively recent or to further lagged fiscal periods, 
or to both time frames. Prior research has not distinguished restatements along this dimension, 
but we do so because we are concerned with how restatements affect the historical record of 
earnings. We distinguish restatements which are announced no later than four months after the 
end of the last fiscal year restated, termed “current restatements,” from restatements announced 
more than four months after the end of the last fiscal year restated, termed “lagged restatements.” 
The reason for this distinction is to examine whether investors and analysts treat restatements of 
the current year’s earnings that are announced within the normal annual financial reporting 
period differently from late restatements. It is often alleged that investors and analysts focus 
excessively on current earnings, and thus these users may view late restatements as stale, As 
reported in Table 2, Panels A and B, 661 (81%) restatements are current and 160 (19%) are 
lagged; of the lagged restatements, 143 (17%) are disclosed up to one year after the threshold 
(four months after the end of the fiscal year of the most recent restated period) and 17 (2%) are 
announced more than one year after this threshold. We indicate current and lagged restatements 
by the dichotomous variables current and lagged, respectively. 
 14
Prior research has analyzed the total amount of the restatement across the restated fiscal 
periods, which we denote by mag (for magnitude). In contrast with prior studies, we decompose 
mag into the amount of current restatement related to the most recent fiscal year restated, 
denoted by currentmag, and the amount related to all preceding periods, denoted by laggedmag. 
That is, laggedmag includes the lagged portion of current restatements and the total amount of 
lagged restatements. (These two components of laggedmag are effectively separated in our 
empirical analyses of the current and lagged restatement subsamples discussed in Section V.)17    
Mag equals the sum of currentmag and laggedmag. 
The following hypothetical example clarifies these definitions. Suppose a calendar year 
firm announces the following restatement of earnings on July 30, 1998: Earnings for the first two 
quarters of 1998 are reduced by $100, and earnings for 1997 and 1996 are reduced by $300 and 
$50, respectively. In this example, the restatement is current (announced before the end of the 
current fiscal year); the variable currentmag is –$100, laggedmag is –$350 (the sum of –$300 
and –$50), and mag (total restatement) is –$450 (the sum of –$100 and –$350). While both 
currentmag and laggedmag are revisions of historical figures, the former relates to current year’s 
earnings history, while the latter relates to the lagged historical record of earnings.   
Prior research has shown that mag is positively associated with the restatement 
announcement return, and we expect this association to hold for both our currentmag and 
laggedmag. Surprisingly, Palmrose and Scholz (2004) find that mag is positively associated with 
the likelihood that a class action lawsuit is filed (recall, positive mag is an earnings increase), and 
accordingly we do not make a prediction about the effect of currentmag or laggedmag on that 
likelihood. 
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Currentmag, laggedmag, and mag are each deflated by market capitalization of the firm 
at the beginning of the three-day (day before to day after) restatement announcement return 
window. As reported in Table 2, Panel D, currentmag, laggedmag, and mag have negative 
means (earnings reducting) of –0.034, –0.030, and –0.065, respectively. Of the total sample, 619 
(75%) of the restatements involve net reductions of cumulative earnings (negative mag), and 119 
(14%) involve net increases in cumulative earnings (positive mag). The remaining 83 (10%) of 
the restatements have zero effect on cumulative earnings (zero mag). Of these 83 restatements, 
eight involve perfectly offsetting effects on currentmag and laggedmag, 69 involve perfectly 
offsetting effects on earnings for fiscal periods within the time period reflected in either or both 
of currentmag or laggedmag, and six involve restatements for which the amount was never 
disclosed.  
Our primary test variables reflect the effect of the restatement on the histories of earnings 
growth and positive earnings. The fact that the sample restatements differ in terms of the specific 
periods restated, involving various combinations of fiscal quarters and years, complicates our 
ability to quantify the effects on prior patterns in a comparable manner across firms. For 
simplicity, we analyze only the effect of restatements on the history of annual earnings, with the 
exception of the most recent fiscal year restated when it does not involve a complete year. For 
the latter, we define the most recent fiscal year as the portion of the year up to the most recent 
fiscal quarter restated.18 We make this exception to avoid a look-ahead bias. 
Our primary measures of the effects of a restatement on the history of earnings are two 
indicator variables: (a) undoearngrow, which takes a value of one for firms that prior to the 
restatement had a continuous history of positive annual earnings growth (in dollar terms) of one 
or more years which was eliminated or shortened by the restatement; and (b) undoearnpos, 
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which takes a value of one for firms that prior to the restatement had a continuous history of 
positive annual earnings for one or more years which was eliminated or shortened by the 
restatement.19 We expect the market effect of restatements to be more negative and pronounced 
when either undoearngrow or undoearnpos takes a value of one, all else equal. As reported in 
Table 2, Panels A and C, undoearngrow takes a value of one for 96 observations (12% of the 
sample), which is slightly more than a quarter of the 362 (44%) observations with a history of 
earnings growth in our sample. Undoearnpos takes a value of one for 153 (19%) observations, 
which is slightly less than a third of the 485 (59%) observations with a history of positive 
earnings.20 The relatively low percentages of the sample observations with a history of earnings 
growth (44%) or of positive earnings (59%) indicate the prior spotty performance of many 
restating firms, documented by Kinney and McDaniel (1989). 
As indicated above, for current restatements we define the current year as the first quarter 
of the year up to the most recent quarter restated, which can be less than four quarters. This 
definition affects undoearngrow because it will typically be more difficult for a firm to have 
reported a history of earnings growth if a restatement occurs early in the fiscal year (i.e., the most 
recent period is less than a year). Reflecting this fact, 74 (77%) of the 96 restatements for which 
undoearngrow takes a value of one involve either three-quarters or all of the most recent fiscal 
year, despite the fact that restatements are spread fairly evenly across the fiscal quarters of the 
most recent fiscal year. This definition does not have a similarly significant effect on 
undoearnpos, the elimination of a positive earnings history, however. 
In specification analysis, we examine two additional indicator variables related to the 
length of the history of earnings growth or positive earnings, using a dividing line of four years 
to distinguish firms with longer from those with shorter histories: grow4 takes a value of one for 
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firms with a four-year or longer history of earnings growth affected by the restatement, and pos4 
takes a value of one for firms with a four-year or longer history of positive earnings affected by 
the restatement.21 We have 32 observations with grow4=1, and 243 observations with pos4=1. 
Consistent with the findings of Barth et al. (1999), Myers and Skinner (2002), and Skinner and 
Sloan (2002) discussed in Section III, we expect a harsher impact on returns from a restatement 
that eliminates or shortens a history of past earnings growth (undoearngrow = 1) if grow4 also 
takes a value of one. Similarly, we expect a restatement that eliminates or shortens a history of 
positive earnings (undoearnpos = 1) to have more negative returns implications if pos4 also takes 
a value of one. Finally, the joint variable undoearngrowpos takes a value of one (for 201 
observations) for firms with either undoearngrow or undoearnpos equaling one. 
We also include in the analysis the following variables that prior research by Palmrose et 
al. (2004), Anderson and Yohn (2002), and Wu (2003) (PRS, AY, and Wu, respectively) finds to 
be significantly related to the market reaction to restatement announcements: An indicator 
variable, revenue, for restatements that involve revenue recognition22—we expect such 
restatements to have more adverse return implications than other restatements—and indicator 
variables for restatements required by the SEC (SEC) or those that the firm admitted fraud 
(fraud). Consistent with prior findings, we expect restatements required by the SEC to have less 
adverse implications and those involving fraud more adverse implications than other 
restatements. As reported in Table 2, Panel A, revenue takes a value of one for 334 (41%) 
observations, SEC takes a value of one for 193 (24%) observations, and fraud takes a value of 
one for 92 (12%) observations. 
We obtained from the CRSP database daily raw, beta-adjusted, and size-adjusted returns 
as well as market capitalizations at the beginning of the return window. Reflecting our short 
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return window, all of our results are virtually identical irrespective of the return measure used, 
and accordingly we report below only results for beta-adjusted returns. Buy-and-hold beta-
adjusted returns for the three-day window around the restatement announcement are denoted by 
R–1,1. 
Table 2, Panel E, reports Pearson correlations for the variables used in the primary 
returns analysis. The correlations of the announcement period return with the variables examined 
in prior research are all consistent with the results of that research: R-1,1 (the announcement 
period return) is significantly negatively correlated with revenue (restatements involving revenue 
recognition), nonumbers (restatements reported without amounts), and fraud (restatements of 
firms admitting fraud), and is significantly positively correlated with SEC (SEC-initiated 
restatements). The correlations are also consistent with our hypotheses regarding the main test 
variables, with R-1,1 being significantly negatively correlated with undoearngrow and 
undoearnpos (pattern-disrupting restatements). As expected, R-1,1 is significantly positively 
correlated with mag (total magnitude of restatement across periods) and currentmag. 
Unexpectedly, although consistent with investors and analysts viewing restatements of lagged 
earnings as stale, R-1,1 is insignificantly correlated with laggedmag. While we made no 
predictions in this regard, R-1,1 is significantly negatively correlated with current (restatements 
announced within four months after the end of the fiscal year of the most recent restated period). 
Our main test variables, undoearngrow and undoearnpos (eliminating or shortening 
histories of earnings growth or positive earnings, respectively), are significantly correlated with 
many of the other explanatory variables. The signs of these correlations reflect the expected 
adverse implications for investors of these test variables taking the value of one. Specifically, 
both the primary variables are significantly negatively associated with mag and currentmag, and 
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undoearnpos is also significantly negatively associated with laggedmag.  Both variables are 
significantly positively associated with nonumbers and fraud. Undoearnpos is also significantly 
positively associated with revenue. The multivariate regressions reported next control for these 
explanatory variables and thus provide evidence on the incremental capital market implications 
of the primary test variables. 
 
VI. RETURNS ANALYSIS 
Full Sample Analysis 
Reflecting the discussion in Sections IV and V, our primary returns models are all nested 
within the following equation: 
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Equation (1) embodies two essential extensions of the empirical models used in the prior 
literature. First, it allows us to examine the relevance of our primary test variables, 
undoearngrow and undoearnpos, by excluding or including them in the analysis. Based on the 
hypotheses stated in Section IV, we expect the coefficients on these two variables to be negative. 
Second, equation (1) allows us to examine the relevance of the distinction between the current 
and lagged components of mag (the total magnitude of restatements) by including in the equation 
either mag alone or the variables current, currentmag, and laggedmag together. As discussed in 
Section V, we expect the regression intercept (which captures the average capital market reaction 
to lagged restatements when current is included in the model and to all restatements otherwise) 
to be negative. We do not have expectations for the coefficient on current (which captures the 
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incremental average market reaction to current restatements), and we expect the coefficients on 
currentmag, laggedmag, and mag to be positive.  
Based on the prior research summarized in Section III, we expect the intercept and the 
coefficients on revenue, nonumbers, and fraud in equation (1) to be negative, and the coefficients 
on mag and SEC to be positive. When our expectations for coefficients are directional 
(nondirectional), unless indicated otherwise, we say a coefficient is significant if the t statistic is 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level in a one-tailed (two-tailed) test. 
Table 3 reports the pooled OLS estimation of three models nested within equation (1). 
The left column reports the estimates of a model that corresponds to the significant variables 
reported in the prior literature; this model excludes the variables current, currentmag, 
laggedmag, undoearngrow, and undoearnpos. Consistent with that literature, the intercept is 
significantly negative (t = –5.9), the coefficient on mag is significantly positive (t = 2.1), the 
coefficients on revenue (t = –4.4), nonumbers (t = –6.9), and fraud (t = –4.4) are significantly 
negative, and the coefficient on SEC is significantly positive (t = 3.7). The model’s adjusted R2 is 
17.4%. Thus, the total magnitude of restatements across years affects returns in the predicted 
direction. Furthermore, returns are more negative when restatements involve revenue 
recognition, are announced without amounts, or involve fraud, and are more positive when 
restatements are initiated by the SEC. 
The middle column of Table 3 reports the results of decomposing mag into its timeliness 
components, currentmag and laggedmag, and adding the indicator variable current, but 
otherwise maintaining the same model as in the left column of the table. As expected, the 
intercept (average market reaction to lagged restatements) is significantly negative (t=-3.0).  The 
coefficient on current (average incremental reaction to current restatements) is insignificantly 
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negative. Also as expected, the coefficient on currentmag is significantly positive (t = 3.4); it is 
also significantly more positive at the 10% level than the coefficient on mag in the model 
reported in the left column (t = 1.6). Note that the insignificant coefficient on laggedmag does 
not imply that lagged restatements have no capital market implications. They indeed do, as 
indicated by the subsample analysis that follows. The coefficients on the variables common to 
the models in the left two columns of Table 3 are virtually identical, although the significance of 
the intercept is noticeably lower in the middle column, reflecting the additional explanatory 
power obtained by decomposing mag into its currentmag and laggedmag components. The 
model R2 rises from 17.4% to 18.4%, implying that it is important to distinguish between the 
magnitudes of the current and lagged components of restatements. 
The right column of Table 3 reports the results of adding to the model the primary 
pattern-disruption test variables undoearngrow and undoearnpos. As expected, the coefficient on 
undoearngrow is significantly negative (t = –2.8), as is the coefficient on undoearnpos (t = –2.5). 
The coefficients on the variables common to the models in the middle and right columns retain 
the same signs and yield the same conclusions with respect to significance across the models, 
although the inclusion of the primary test variables noticeably reduces the significance of the 
intercept and the coefficients on currentmag and nonumbers. The model’s R2 rises to 20.2%. 
These results indicate that changes in the history of earnings growth or positive earnings brought 
about by the restatement—the focus of our analysis—do affect investors’ decisions. 
 
Subsample Analysis 
 Table 4 reports estimates of the model in the right column of Table 3 (to the extent the 
independent variables vary) for two subsamples of observations: (1) current versus lagged 
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restatements, and (2) restatements involving admitted fraud versus other restatements. The first 
subsample is examined to determine whether there are significant differences between current 
and lagged restatements, consistent with our focus on the implications of restatements on the 
historical record of earnings. An additional insight of this analysis is that it distinguishes the 
implications of the two components of laggedmag: the lagged portion of current restatements 
and all of lagged restatements. The second subsample is examined to determine whether our 
overall results are driven by the extreme observations of admitted fraud, or that the results are 
also valid for the non-fraud restatements.  To the extent that our results are attributable in whole 
or part to non-fraud observations, they can be generalized to other revisions of accrual estimates.  
Note that current cannot be included in either the current or lagged subsample analysis 
and, in addition, currentmag cannot be included in the lagged subsample analysis due to no 
variation of these variables across the observations. Similarly, fraud cannot be included in the 
model for the fraud subsamples. The coefficient differences between each pair of subsamples and 
the associated t statistics are reported in Table 4. A limitation of these analyses is that the lagged 
restatement and fraud subsamples are relatively small at 160 and 92 observations, respectively, 
reducing the power of the tests of coefficients for these subsamples and of differences of 
coefficients across the subsamples.   
The first and second columns (from left) of Table 4 reports the results for the current and 
lagged restatement subsamples, respectively, with the third column reporting differences in the 
coefficients across the two subsamples. The estimates for the current restatement subsample are 
quite similar to those for the overall sample in the right column of Table 3, although the 
coefficient on laggedmag is insignificantly positive rather than insignificantly negative. The 
reason for this difference is apparent in the results for the lagged restatement subsample, for 
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which the coefficient on laggedmag is significantly negative at the 10% level. The difference 
between the coefficients on laggedmag in the current and lagged subsamples is significantly 
positive at the 10% level (t=1.4). This suggests that the market reacts differently to the 
magnitude of lagged restatements (announced more than four months after last fiscal-year end) 
than to the magnitude of the lagged portion of current restatements. Conceivably, this difference 
may be attributable to the reversing property of accruals discussed in Section IV.23 Since by 
construction lagged restatements have no (reversing) effect on current earnings, these 
restatements may be more likely to reverse in future earnings, compared to the lagged portion of 
current restatements.   
A number of the other coefficients are noticeably different for the current and lagged 
restatements subsamples, although only the difference of the coefficients on SEC is significant at 
the usual level (t=2.1).  Specifically, unlike the significantly positive coefficient on SEC in the 
current restatement subsample, the coefficient on SEC is close to zero and insignificant in the 
lagged restatement subsample.  This difference is probably attributable to current SEC 
restatements being more likely to reflect a recently arisen accounting issue applying to many 
firms (e.g., in-process research and development), whereas lagged SEC restatements being more 
likely to be firm specific. The coefficients on fraud and nonumbers also are more negative in the 
lagged restatement subsample, suggesting that some of these restatements involve systematic 
financial reporting problems that went undiscovered for a period of time and so take time to 
investigate. In contrast, the intercept and coefficient on revenue are less negative, suggesting that 
on average lagged restatements are less adverse. The coefficients on undoearngrow and 
undoearnpos—our primary variables—are quite similar across the two subsamples, suggesting 
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the impact of a restatement on the historical pattern of earnings is important regardless of the 
type of restatement.   
The fourth and fifth columns (from left) of Table 4 report the results for the fraud and no-
fraud subsamples, respectively, with the right column reporting differences in the coefficients 
across the two subsamples. As indicated by the significantly more negative intercept in the fraud 
than no-fraud subsample (t=-2.5), restatements involving admitted fraud have considerably more 
adverse implications for investors than no-fraud restatements. Perhaps reflecting the small size of 
the fraud sample, the only coefficient that is significant in the fraud subsample is nonumbers 
(t=-2.3). The results for the no-fraud subsample are quite similar to those for the overall sample 
in the right column of Table 3. So, our findings regarding pattern-disrupting restatements are not 
driven by those involving fraud. Aside from the difference of the intercepts just mentioned, none 
of the coefficient differences across the fraud and no-fraud subsamples are significant.   
     
Specification Analysis 
In Table 5, we report the results of supplemental analyses that arise from the following 
variant of equation (1): 
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Equation (2) allows us to examine the importance of interacting longer histories of earnings 
growth (grow4) or positive earnings (pos4) with the primary test variables undoearngrow and 
undoearnpos. We expect the coefficients on both undoearngrow × grow4 and undoearnpos × 
pos4 to be negative, implying a more pronounced adverse investor reaction when the restatement 
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eliminates or shortens a lengthy, persistent string of earnings growth or positive earnings relative 
to the effect of undoing shorter histories. Equation (2) also allows us to examine how much if 
any explanatory power is lost by replacing undoearngrow and undoearnpos with 
undoearngrowpos (a single variable that indicates restatements that undo histories of either 
earnings growth or positive earnings). We expect a negative coefficient on undoearngrowpos. 
The left column of Table 5 reports the estimates of the model adding undoearngrow × 
grow4 and undoearnpos × pos4 to the model in the right column of Table 3 (i.e., progressing 
from equation (1) to equation (2)). As expected, the coefficient on undoearngrow × grow4 is 
significantly negative (t = –2.1), consistent with a harsher investor reaction to eliminating or 
shortening a long history of earnings growth. Unexpectedly, however, the coefficient on 
undoearnpos × pos4 is significantly positive (t = 2.8); moreover, this coefficient almost perfectly 
offsets the negative coefficient on undoearnpos. This coefficient sign is inconsistent with the 
expected adverse implications from the elimination or shortening of a long string of positive 
earnings. We conjecture that this result arises from the proxy role of pos4 for the solvency of the 
firm, consistent with prior research which shows that positive earnings correlate with positive 
cash flows and other solvency indicators.24  The coefficients on the other variables in this model 
closely mirror those in the right column of Table 3, although the significance of the intercept 
continues to diminish. The model’s R2 rises by 0.9% to 21.1% compared to the model in the third 
column of Table 3. These results imply that it is important to consider the length of the history of 
earnings growth or positive earnings that is eliminated or shortened by a restatement. 
The right column of Table 5 reports the results of replacing undoearngrow and undoearnpos 
with undoearngrowpos. In this model, undoearngrowpos is significantly negative  (t = –4.2), and 
the model R2 falls by only 0.1% to 20.1%, compared to the model in the right column of Table 3, 
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implying that little information is lost by replacing undoearngrow and undoearnpos with 
undoearngrowpos. 
In untabulated robustness analyses we added the following control variables to the returns 
models (1) and (2): market capitalization, number of years restated, indicator variables for 
whether there were prior restatements by the same firm anytime in our sample period or in the 
prior three years, indicator variables for whether prior restatements gave rise to lawsuits or were 
SEC-enforced, prior six-month buy-and-hold beta-adjusted return (momentum), an indicator 
variable for confounding events in the restatement announcement window, an indicator variable 
for whether the restatement involved a 10-K filing or just 10-Q filings, and an institutional 
ownership measure specified as either a percentage of ownership or as a high versus low 
indicator variable. None of these variables was statistically significant, and none exerted a 
significant effect on the primary variables. 
 
VII. CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT ANALYSIS 
Descriptive Statistics 
The indicator variable lawsuit takes a value of one if a class action lawsuit was filed as a 
result of the restatement (generally very shortly afterwards). As reported in Table 6, Panel A, 
lawsuit takes a value of one for 211 observations, amounting to 26% of the sample. Panel A also 
reports counts of indicator variables for the subsamples of no-lawsuit and lawsuit observations, 
with χ2 test statistics for differences in these counts across the subsamples. These counts indicate 
that the lawsuit subsample clearly involves significantly more value-decreasing restatements than 
does the no-lawsuit subsample, is significantly more likely to have undoearngrow, undoearnpos, 
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revenue, nonumbers, and fraud take values of one, and to have SEC take a value of zero than the 
no-lawsuit subsample.  
Furthermore, Table 6, Panel B reports the means and medians of the continuous 
variables, with corresponding t and χ2 test statistics, indicating similar effects for the lawsuit and 
no-lawsuit subsamples.  Compared to the no-lawsuit subsample, the lawsuit subsample has 
substantially more negative mag (total restatement magnitude), R–1,1 (the restatement 
announcement period mean return is -5.7% for the no-lawsuit group and –25.0% for the lawsuit 
group), and buy-and-hold beta-adjusted return for the six months preceding the restatement 
announcement (R-127,-2). This is consistent with the general evidence on investor lawsuits 
indicating that a large price drop upon the announcement of an adverse event is a necessary 
(though not sufficient) condition for a lawsuit (e.g., Lu, 2003). Similar effects are indicated by 
the Pearson correlations of lawsuit with the other variables, reported in Table 6, Panel C:  
Lawsuit is significantly positively correlated with undoearngrow, undoearnpos, revenue, 
nonumbers, and fraud, and it is significantly negatively correlated with currentmag, SEC, R–1,1, 
and R–127,–2. 
 
Full Sample Analysis 
Building on the discussion in Sections IV and V, our class action lawsuit models are 
nested within the following equation: 
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Equation (3) regresses the dichotomous variable lawsuit on the set of explanatory variables 
present in the returns model (1) and reported in the right column of Table 3, with the addition of 
the returns variables R–1,1 and R–127,–2. Palmrose and Scholz (2004) report that the short-window 
restatement announcement return has a significantly negative coefficient, consistent with the 
announcement return reflecting the severity of the restatement and class action lawyers’ 
incentives to file lawsuits. We add to the model the return during six months prior to the 
restatement announcement, as it is likely to capture news about the restatement leaking out 
before disclosure, and we accordingly expect this return to have a negative coefficient in relation 
to the likelihood of lawsuit. 
We expect the coefficients on the remaining variables in equation (3) to have the opposite 
sign they had in the returns analysis; that is, we expect the coefficients on undoearngrow, 
undoearnpos, revenue, nonumbers, and fraud to be positive, and the coefficient on SEC to be 
negative. However, because Palmrose and Scholz (2004) report a somewhat puzzling positive 
coefficient on mag, we do not predict the sign of currentmag and laggedmag, despite the positive 
coefficient on currentmag in the returns analysis.25  
Table 7 reports the pooled estimation of equation (3), both including and excluding the 
returns variables, since these variables are likely to subsume some of the effects of the other 
explanatory variables. Because the dependent variable lawsuit is binary, we primarily estimate 
equation (3) using a logit estimation, although for comparison purposes and to provide an R2 
estimate we also report the results of an OLS estimation. Table 7 also reports the marginal 
effects of the explanatory variables on the probability of a lawsuit implied by the coefficients 
from the logit estimation when these variables increase by one. 
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The second column from the left in Table 7 reports the logit estimation of equation (3), 
excluding the returns variables. As expected, the coefficient on the primary test variable 
undoearngrow is significantly positive (t = 2.8), as is the coefficient on undoearnpos, though 
only at the 10% level (t = 1.3). Thus, eliminating or shortening a history of earnings growth or of 
positive earnings significantly raises the probability of a class action lawsuit being filed 
subsequent to a restatement. The marginal effect of undoearngrow taking a value of one on the 
probability of a class action lawsuit being filed is very substantial: 13.1%. The coefficients on 
the control variables generally conform to expectations and/or to the returns results: the 
coefficients on current (t = 2.5), revenue (t = 4.2), nonumbers (t = 7.0), and fraud (t = 5.1) are 
significantly positive, although the coefficient on SEC is insignificant. The marginal effects of 
the significant control variables on the probability of lawsuit are all substantial, ranging from 
13.1% for revenue to 22.8% for fraud. The model classifies 78.3% of the observations correctly, 
which is a significant improvement over the naïve model which classifies all restatements as no-
lawsuits (χ2 = 100.9). This latter model classifies 74.3% of the observations correctly. 
In Table 7, the second from right column reports the logit estimation of equation (3) 
including the two returns variables (prior to and around the restatement announcement). 
Consistent with the findings of Palmrose and Scholz (2004), the coefficient on R-1,1 is 
significantly negative (t = –8.6), as is the coefficient and R–127,–2 (t = –2.6). The variable R-1,1 (the 
short-window announcement return) is a particularly powerful explanatory variable. Its inclusion 
in the model reduces the significance of the other explanatory variables, yet the coefficient on 
undoearngrow remains significantly positive (t = 2.0). The model classifies 81.8% of the 
observations correctly—a significant improvement over the naïve model which classifies all 
restatements as non-lawsuits—delivering only 74.3% accuracy (χ2 = 190.3). 
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Table 8 provides information on the percentage of no-lawsuit and lawsuit observations 
classified correctly (equivalently, one minus the percentages of Type I and Type II errors under 
the null hypothesis of no lawsuit) by the logit estimation of equation (3) with the return variables 
included. Notably, the percentage of observations predicted correctly is considerably lower for 
lawsuits than for no-lawsuits. For example, 49.3% of actual lawsuits are predicted as such (Type 
II error equal to 50.7%), while 93.0% of the no-lawsuits are predicted as no-lawsuits (Type I 
error equal to 7.0%).  This differential classification ability likely results from no-lawsuits being 
almost three times more common in the sample than lawsuits and from the logit estimation 
imposing the same loss for misclassifying lawsuits as no-lawsuits and no-lawsuits as lawsuits. To 
provide further insight, Table 8 presents detailed analysis of the percentages of actual lawsuit 
and no-lawsuit observations that are correctly predicted by equation (3) for the overall and post-
PSLRA samples, discussed in the next section. The second row of Table 8 indicates that the 
percentage of lawsuits that are correctly predicted as such is considerably higher for the post-
PSLRA sample: 61.2% vs. 49.3%. These results are consistent with the conjecture (elaborated 
below) that class action litigation is increasingly accounting-driven following the passage of the 
PSLRA. 
 
Specification Analyses   
Since the existence of a prior class action lawsuit could affect the likelihood that a 
lawsuit was filed after the restatement, we conducted the following two specification analyses. 
First, we added indicator variables for whether the lawsuit preceded the restatement (one 
observation) or prior restatements gave rise to a lawsuit either anytime during our sample period 
(21 observations) or during the three years preceding the restatement under consideration (19 
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observations). Second, we redefined the dependent variable to also take a value of one if a 
lawsuit preceded the restatement or was associated with a prior restatement, either anytime 
during our sample period or during the three years preceding the restatement under 
consideration.  Neither of these analyses had significant effects on our results.   
In addition, we conducted various untabulated robustness tests adding explanatory 
variables similar to those included in to the returns analysis discussed in Section VI. None of 
these variables was statistically significant or exerted a significant effect on the primary variables 
in the model. 
 
The Post-PSLRA Period 
Table 9 reports the analysis in Table 7, but for the subsample of 540 restatements 
announced after the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) on 
December 22, 1995. Grundfest and Perino (1997) among others report that post-PSLRA, 
accounting issues drive a larger portion of shareholder litigation and settlements than in the pre-
PSLRA era. It is therefore instructive to examine the effect of PSLRA on our restatements 
sample. 
It is evident from Table 9 that the results of the lawsuit analysis for the post-PSLRA 
period are stronger in certain respects than those for the entire sample period. In particular, our 
test variables undoearngrow and undoearnpos are more significant in this subsample, and the 
model as a whole performs better in classifying observations compared to a naïve model (see 
also Table 8). We conjecture that this change reflects the effect of the increasingly accounting-
driven nature of class action litigation following the passage of the PSLRA. 
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VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We document in this study that earnings restatements informing about significant 
changes in the historical pattern of earnings—the elimination or shortening of previously 
reported records of earnings growth or positive earnings—significantly affect investors’ 
valuation of current financial data, and enhance the likelihood of class action lawsuits filed after 
the restatements. We control in our analysis for the effects of restatements on the magnitudes of 
current and lagged earnings, as well as for various attributes of restatements that the prior 
literature has found to be associated with investor reaction and the likelihood of class action 
lawsuits, and for a slew of other variables. Henry Ford is reputed to have said “history is more or 
less bunk.” Our empirical evidence on the relevance of rewriting earnings history dispels Ford’s 
view, at least insofar as accounting information is concerned. 
Our findings about the valuation-relevance of changes in historical patterns of earnings, 
along with prior research on the relevance of the historical record of financial information, raise 
an important question for accounting standards setters: Should a revision of the historical 
financial record be required when newly revealed information contradicts the 
assumptions/projections underlying previously disclosed financial data, or should revisions be 
restricted to mistakes or oversight that existed at the time the financial statements were prepared 
(APB20)? The issues involved in such an extension of the scope of restatements are, of course, 
complex. APB 20 makes a clear distinctive between “[e]rrors in financial statements [resulting 
from] oversight or misuse of facts that existed at the time the financial statements were 
prepared”—which call for a restatement—and a “change in accounting estimate [which] results 
from new information or subsequent developments”—which does not lead to a restatement 
(emphasis ours). However, in reality, the distinction between information which existed at the 
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financial reporting time and new information is often blurred.  Consider, for example, a 
deterioration in the financial conditions of a customer ignored in the most recent provision for 
uncollectible receivables.  How can one objectively determine whether the customer’s financial 
deterioration was knowable at the financial reporting time (and, therefore, warrants a 
restatement) or not?  Perhaps, had the firm consulted a credit agency, or performed an elaborate 
solvency analysis, the subsequent financial deterioration of the customer could have been 
predicted, and thus necessitates a restatement. With the passage of time subsequent to the 
financial report release it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between information 
which was known, knowable, and unknowable (e.g., a hurricane) “at the time” the financial 
reports were prepared. 
These difficulties obviously allow firms to interpret APB 20 narrowly, claiming that most 
inconsistencies between estimates and projections underlying financial reports and subsequent 
realizations were not known or knowable at the time the financial reports were prepared. Our 
evidence on the importance to investors of refreshing the historical financial record as well as the 
substantial increases in the number of restatements, and recent FASB pronouncements (e.g., FAS 
154) emphasizing the relevance of intertemporal comparability and consistency of financial 
information, suggest that a reexamination of the circumstances calling for a restatement is 
warranted.    
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NOTES
                                                 
1 There are a few other cases where firms are required to disclose revisions of historical records. 
For example, FAS 146 requires firms to disclose revisions of liabilities accrued for exit or 
disposal activities. 
2 This may be attributable in part to findings (e.g., Ball and Watts (1972)) that earnings tend to 
follow a random walk, although Brooks and Buckmaster (1980) report that this is not the case for 
firms with large absolute earnings changes. We discuss the issue of earnings following a random 
walk in more detail in Section IV.  
3 There are, of course, exceptions to this statement, such as Barth et al. (1999). 
4 For elaboration on the role of historical context in general in understanding and interpreting 
current events, see Howard (1991, Ch.1). 
5 See, for example, Mankiw and Shapiro (1986) and Diebold and Rudenbusch (1991). 
6 A literature similarly motivated to that of earnings restatements examines property-casualty 
insurers’ loss reserve development disclosures. Under the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Exchange Act Industry Guide 4, property-casualty insurers are required annually 
to update prior estimates of their claim loss reserves for each prior accident year’s coverage. 
This literature documents that loss reserves are estimated with discretion (e.g., loss reserve 
revisions are negatively correlated with insurer solvency and positively serially correlated), and 
that upward loss reserve revisions have negative implications for insurers’ market value, risk, 
and future profitability. See Petroni (1992), Beaver and McNichols (1998,2001), and Petroni, 
Ryan, and Wahlen (2000).   
7 Feroz et al. (1991) and Dechow et al. (1996) find similar negative market reactions at the 
announcement of SEC enforcement actions. 
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8 In a specification test, PRS (2004) replace the magnitude of the restatement with an indicator 
variable for restatements that decrease current income and the absolute value of the change in net 
income; they find that the coefficients on both variables are significantly negative. 
9 While it may seem surprising that the market reacts less adversely to SEC-enforced earnings 
restatements, this finding presumably reflects the fact that these restatements often result from 
the SEC’s desire to change a general accounting practices (e.g., in-process research and 
development) which affects multiple firms. To the extent that more firms make these 
restatements, they apparently reflect less negatively on any given restating firm. 
10 PRS (2004), AY (2002), and Wu (2003) include numerous control variables in their returns 
regression models which they find (and in supplemental analysis we confirm) to be insignificant. 
Of particular note, Wu finds that the coefficient on an indicator variable for confounding 
significant disclosures or events in the restatement announcement window is insignificantly 
negative.     
11 Dechow et al. (1996) conduct similar analyses and obtain similar findings for SEC 
enforcement actions. 
12 Summers and Sweeney (1998) document similar stock sales by insiders prior to the revelation 
of fraud, as does Beneish (1999) prior to SEC enforcement actions. 
13 Bonner et al. (1998) obtain similar results for the filing of lawsuits against the auditors of firms 
subject to SEC enforcement actions. 
14 A related issue is that restatements of earnings, like all accrual adjustments, reverse over time.  
Sometimes these reversals are complete when restatements are announced (restatements that 
decrease earnings in certain periods, and increase earnings by the same amount in other periods), 
and sometimes they are incomplete (e.g., restatements that only decrease earnings prior to 
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announcement).  Whether these reversals are complete or not has implications for the prediction 
of future earnings and so may affect returns or the likelihood of class action lawsuits differently 
(e.g., investors may not be fully aware of the future reversals in the second type of restatements, 
above). We do not explore this issue. 
15 Most of this sample was collected by Wu (2003), excluding her restatements of previously 
announced unofficial results. We extended her sample forward in time by collecting 83 
additional restatements in 2001 and 2002. We also augmented her data with annual earnings data 
for nonrestated fiscal years (which we use to construct our measures of earnings history), which 
we collected from Compustat (data item 172), and stock returns data, which we retrieved from 
CRSP. 
16 The number of restatements continues to increase. According to Huron Consulting Group 
(quoted in Bryan et al. 2005), there were 323 restatements in 2003 and 414 in 2004. Jeff Szafran, 
Huron’s managing director, attributes the 2004 increase to the “unprecedented level of regulatory 
and audit scrutiny, driven primarily by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.” Apparently casting a 
wider net, Glass Lewis & Co. reports 1,195 restatements by U.S. firms in 2005.     
17 Currentmag takes a nonzero value for 606 observations. Laggedmag takes a nonzero value for 
389 observations, of which 224 involve nonzero restatements of earnings in one prior year, 106 
in two prior years, 43 in three prior years, 12 in four prior years, and four in five prior years.    
18 This is the case in our hypothetical example above. The most recent restatement was for the 
first two quarters of 1998, which we treat as a fiscal year. 
19 In calculating undoearngrow and undoearnpos, we examined histories or earnings up to seven 
years prior to the most recent fiscal year restated. Of the 821 restatement observations, nine have 
continuous histories of earnings growth of seven years or more, five of which were eliminated by 
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the restatement, while 130 observations have continuous histories of positive earnings of seven 
years or more, 22 of which were eliminated by the restatement. Undoearngrow and undoearnpos 
can take values of one because of any year that is both involved in the restatement and part of the 
prior history of earnings growth or positive earnings, respectively.     
20 Both undoearngrow and undoearnpos take values of one for 48 (6%) of the observations.   
21Given the size of our sample, we chose four years as the cutoff for grow4 and pos4 in an 
attempt to obtain a sizeable number of observations with a substantial history of earnings growth 
or positive earnings. The use of longer histories of earnings growth or positive earnings (e.g., the 
five-year history examined by Barth et al. 1999) reduces the number of observations with such 
histories significantly, especially for earnings growth, whereas shorter histories provide less 
contrast with our primary variables. 
22 Wu (2003) classifies the primary reason for/line items affected by the restatement into nine 
categories: 1) both revenue and operating expenses, 2) revenue only, 3) operating expenses only, 
4) loan loss allowances, 5) mergers and acquisitions, 6) in-process research and development, 7) 
reclassification, 8) errors, and 9) other. We include categories 1 and 2 in our indicator variable 
revenue. 
23 See note 14.  
24 For example, this conjecture is consistent with Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Dechow et 
al.’s (2003) findings that firms with (even slightly) positive earnings have greater cash flow and 
various other indicators of solvency than do firms with (even slightly) negative earnings. 
Moreover, we determined that 40 (4.9%) of the firms in our sample declared bankruptcy in the 
year following the restatement announcement, and that firms with pos4=0 are 50% more likely to 
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go bankrupt in the year following the restatement than are firms with pos4=1 (5.7% versus 3.8%, 
respectively).   
25 While we predict and find that the intercept is negative in the return analysis, we make no 
prediction about the intercept in the logit estimation of equation (3), because the estimated 
intercept adjusts to yield the sample average probability of a class action lawsuit, given the 
means of and estimated slope coefficients on the explanatory variables in equation (3).  
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Table 1 
Sample Composition 
 
 
Panel A: Number of Observations Lost Due to Data Requirements 
 
Sample of 10-K or 10-Q restatements        1032 
Observations without perm number, cusip, or cnum, and so information on attributes 
   of the restatement were not collected        19
  Subtotal           1013 
Observations not on CRSP or with missing CRSP data     127
  Subtotal           886 
Observations not on Compustat or with missing Compustat data    65
  Regression sample          821 
Observations with missing restatement amounts (set to zero)    6
Observations with nonzero restatement amounts      815  
 
 
Panel B: Number of Observations by Five-Year Period 
 
1977–1982 (6 years)    12 
1983–1987       84 
1988–1992   100 
1993–1997   172 
1998–2002   453
Total    821 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Panel A: Indicator Variable Counts 
 
 No. of observations Percentage of total (821) observations
current = 1 661 81% 
undoearngrow = 1 96 12% 
undoearnpos = 1 153 19% 
revenue = 1 334 41% 
nonumbers = 1 269 33% 
SEC = 1 193 24% 
fraud = 1 92 11% 
 
 
Panel B: Details on Timeliness of Restatement Announcements 
 
 current = 1 ≤1 year lagged >1 year lagged
No. observations 661 143 17 
Percentage of total observations 81% 17% 2% 
 
 
Panel C: Details on Earnings History Indicator Variables 
 
 No. observations 
(percentage of total observations) 
 Earnings growth Positive earnings
No history 459 
(56%) 
 
336 
(41%) 
 
History 362 
(44%) 
485 
(59%) 
 
Restatement eliminates or reduces history 96 
(12%) 
undoearngrow = 1 
153 
(19%) 
undoearnpos = 1 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
 
Panel D: Means and Quartiles of Continuous Variables 
 
 mean minimum 25% median 75% maximum
mag –0.065 –1.198 –0.058 –0.014 0 0.219 
currentmag –0.034 –0.798 –0.024 –0.003 0 0.168 
laggedmag –0.030 –1.198 –0.015 0 0 0.168 
R–1,1 –0.107 –0.670 –0.192 –0.061 0.002 0.286 
 
 
Panel E: Pearson Correlations of Variables in Primary Returns Analysis 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
current (1) 1          
mag (2) 0.05 1         
currentmag (3) –0.15 0.73 1        
laggedmag (4) 0.23 0.70 0.03 1       
undoearngrow (5) –0.08 –0.12 –0.12 –0.05 1      
undoearnpos (6) 0.05 –0.26 –0.22 –0.15 0.29 1     
revenue (7) 0.08 –0.08 –0.04 –0.08 0.05 0.07 1    
nonumbers (8) 0.03 –0.11 –0.03 –0.12 0.18 0.14 0.15 1   
SEC (9) –0.08 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 –0.04 –0.11 0.03 1  
fraud (10) –0.02 –0.04 –0.00 –0.06 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.26 –0.11 1 
R–1,1 –0.07 0.12 0.13 0.04 –0.18 –0.19 –0.22 –0.30 0.15 –0.27 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
 
Notes: All indicator variables take a value of one if the condition is present and take the value of 
zero otherwise. The continuous variables are winsorized at the outside 1% tails of their 
distributions. Correlations significant at the 5% level or better in a two-tailed test are in boldface. 
 
The variables are defined as: 
 
current  an indicator variable for restatements announced no later than four months 
  after the end of the fiscal year of the most recent fiscal year restated 
mag   the amount of restatements divided by market capitalization at the 
  beginning of the restatement announcement window 
currentmag  the amount of current restatements for most recent fiscal year divided by 
  market capitalization at the beginning of the restatement announcement 
  window 
laggedmag  the amount of current restatements for fiscal years other than the most 
  recent, and of lagged restatements divided by market capitalization at 
  the beginning of the restatement announcement window 
undoearngrow  an indicator variable for restatements that eliminate or reduce the number 
  of consecutive fiscal years the firm has reported earnings growth; the last 
  fiscal year includes only the period up to the most recent fiscal quarter 
  restated 
undoearnpos  an indictor variable for restatements that eliminate or reduce the number 
  of consecutive fiscal years the firm has reported positive earnings; the 
  last fiscal year includes only the portion up to the most recent fiscal 
  quarter restated 
revenue  an indicator variable for restatements involving revenue recognition 
nonumbers  an indicator variable for restatements for which the amount of the 
  restatement is not disclosed at the restatement announcement date 
SEC   an indicator variable for SEC-enforced restatements 
fraud   an indicator variable for restatements involving admissions of fraud 
R-1,1   beta-adjusted returns for the three-day period surrounding the restatement 
  announcement date 
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Table 3 
Primary Returns Analysis 
 
.
1,1
fraudSECnonumbersrevenuesundoearnpo
owundoearngrlaggedmagcurrentmagmagcurrentR
fsnrp
glcc
δδδδγ
γβββαα
+++++
+++++=+−  (1) 
 
 Prior research Distinguish current and 
lagged restatements
Add effect of restatement 
on earnings history
intercept (–) –0.053 
(–5.9) 
–0.044 
(–3.0) 
–0.035 
(–2.3) 
current (?) -- –0.010 
(–0.7) 
–0.013 
(–0.9) 
mag (+) 0.077 
(2.1) 
-- -- 
currentmag (+) -- 0.175 
(3.4) 
0.128 
(2.5) 
laggedmag (+) -- –0.031 
(–0.6) 
–0.050 
(–0.9) 
undoearngrow (–) -- -- –0.052 
(–2.8) 
undoearnpos (–) -- -- –0.039 
(–2.5) 
revenue (–) –0.052 
(–4.4) 
–0.052 
(–4.4) 
–0.050 
(–4.3) 
nonumbers (–) –0.087 
(–6.9) 
–0.088 
(–7.0) 
–0.079 
(–6.3) 
SEC (+) 0.050 
(3.7) 
0.049 
(3.7) 
0.049 
(3.7) 
fraud (–) –0.098 
(–4.4) 
–0.100 
(–5.3) 
–0.094 
(–5.1) 
R2 17.4% 18.4% 20.2% 
 
Notes: All regressions include 821 observations. The sample is described in Table 1. The 
variables are defined and winsorization rules described in the notes to Table 2. Predictions for 
the sign of coefficients are indicated in parentheses next to the variable name. Student t statistics 
appear parenthetically beneath the estimated coefficients. Coefficients appear in boldface if 
significant at the 5% level or better in a one-tailed test if directional predictions are made and a 
two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 4 
Returns Analysis for Restatement Timeliness and Fraud Subsamples 
 
.
1,1
fraudSECnonumbersrevenuesundoearnpo
owundoearngrlaggedmagcurrentmagcurrentR
fsnrp
glcc
δδδδγ
γββαα
+++++
++++=+−  (1) 
 
 Current Lagged Difference Fraud No Fraud Difference
intercept (–) –0.053 
(–5.9) 
–0.017 
(–1.0) 
-0.036 
(-1.5) 
–0.160 
(–2.3) 
-0.029 
(-1.9) 
-0.131 
(-2.5) 
current (?) -- -- 
 
-- 0.024 
(0.4) 
-0.019 
(-1.2) 
0.043 
(0.9) 
currentmag (+) 0.121 
(2.2) 
-- -- -0.052 
(-0.2) 
0.140 
(2.7) 
-.192 
(-1.0) 
laggedmag (+) 0.076 
(.7) 
–0.098 
(–1.8) 
0.174 
(1.4) 
0.033 
(0.2) 
-0.071 
(-1.2) 
0.104 
(0.7) 
undoearngrow (–) -0.056 
(-2.5) 
-0.037 
(-1.2) 
-0.019 
(-0.4) 
–0.026 
(–0.4) 
-0.050 
(-2.5) 
0.024 
(0.4) 
undoearnpos (–) -0.038 
(-2.2) 
-0.052 
(-1.5) 
0.014 
(0.3) 
–0.070 
(–1.3) 
-0.037 
(-2.3) 
-0.033 
(-0.7) 
revenue (–) –0.055 
(–4.1) 
–0.008 
(–.3) 
-0.037 
(-1.5) 
–0.026 
(–0.6) 
-0.054 
(-4.5) 
0.028 
(0.8) 
nonumbers (–) –0.070 
(–4.8) 
–0.121 
(–4.9) 
0.051 
(1.5) 
–0.107 
(–2.3) 
-0.076 
(-5.8) 
-0.031 
(-0.8) 
SEC (+) 0.063 
(4.0) 
-0.004 
(-.2) 
0.067 
(2.1) 
0.107 
(1.6) 
0.045 
(3.3) 
0.062 
(1.1) 
fraud (–) –0.082 
(–3.8) 
–0.153 
(–4.6) 
0.071 
(1.6) 
-- 
 
-- -- 
R2 18.4% 35.9%  16.2% 14.0%  
# observations 661 160  92 729  
 
Notes: The sample is described in Table 1. The variables are defined and winsorization rules 
described in the notes to Table 2. Predictions for the sign of coefficients are indicated in 
parentheses next to the variable name. Student t statistics appear parenthetically beneath the 
estimated coefficients. Coefficients appear in boldface if significant at the 5% level or better in a 
one-tailed test if directional predictions are made and a two-tailed test otherwise. 
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Table 5 
Supplemental Returns Analysis Refining Results for Earnings History 
 
.
)4()4( 44
1,1
fraudSECnonumbersrevenueowposundoearngr
possundoearnposundoearnpogrowowundoearngr
owundoearngrlaggedmagcurrentmagcurrentR
fsnrgp
ppg
glcc
δδδδγ
γγγ
γββαα
+++++
+×++×+
++++=+−
 (2) 
 
 Distinguish earnings histories 
longer than four years
Combine histories of earnings 
growth or positive earnings
intercept (–) –0.032 
(–2.1) 
–0.035 
(–2.4) 
current (?) –0.015 
(–1.0) 
–0.010 
(–0.7) 
currentmag (+) 0.126 
(2.4) 
0.126 
(2.4) 
laggedmag (+) –0.062 
(–1.1) 
–0.052 
(–1.0) 
undoearngrow (–) –0.040 
(–2.0) 
-- 
undoearngrow*grow4 
(–) 
–0.065 
(–2.1) 
-- 
undoearnpos (–) –0.072 
(–3.8) 
-- 
undoearnpos*pos4 (–) 0.074 
(2.8) 
-- 
undoearngrowpos (–) -- –0.057 
(–4.2) 
revenue (–) –0.051 
(–4.4) 
–0.050 
(–4.3) 
nonumbers (–) –0.081 
(–6.4) 
–0.082 
(–6.5) 
SEC (+) 0.047 
(3.5) 
0.049 
(3.7) 
fraud (–) –0.095 
(–5.1) 
–0.097 
(–5.2) 
R2 21.1% 20.1% 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
 
Notes: All regressions include 821 observations. The sample is described in Table 1. The 
variables are defined and winsorization rules described in the notes to Table 2, except that grow4 
is an indicator variable for a history of earnings growth prior to the earnings restatement of four 
fiscal years or longer, pos4 is an indicator variable for a history of positive earnings prior to the 
earnings restatement of four fiscal years or longer, and undoearngrowpos is an indicator variable 
that equals one if either undoearngrow or undoearnpos equals one. Predictions for the sign of 
coefficients are indicated in parentheses next to the variable name. Student t statistics appear 
parenthetically beneath the estimated coefficients. Coefficients appear in boldface if significant 
at the 5% level or better in a one-tailed test if directional predictions are made and a two-tailed 
test otherwise. 
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Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for No-Lawsuit and Lawsuit Subsamples 
 
 
Panel A: Indicator Variable Counts for No-Lawsuit and Lawsuit Subsamples 
 
 lawsuit = 0 
 
No. observations 
(percentage of 
column total)
lawsuit = 1 
 
No. observations 
(percentage of 
column total)
 
χ2 test of 
independence 
across subsamples 
(probability)
all observations in 
column 
610 
(100%) 
[74% of overall 
sample] 
211 
(100%) 
[26% of overall 
sample] 
-- 
current = 1 477 
(78%) 
184 
(87%) 
8.1 
(0.00) 
undoearngrow = 1 50 
(8%) 
46 
(22%) 
28.1 
(0.00) 
undoearnpos = 1 93 
(15%) 
60 
(28%) 
18.0 
(0.00) 
revenue = 1 208 
(34%) 
126 
(60%) 
42.6 
(0.00) 
nonumbers = 1 141 
(23%) 
128 
(61%) 
100.3 
(0.00) 
SEC = 1 154 
(25%) 
39 
(18%) 
4.0 
(0.05) 
fraud = 1 34 
(6%) 
58 
(27%) 
75.7 
(0.00) 
 
 
Panel B: Means and Medians of Continuous Variables 
 
  means   medians  
 lawsuit = 
0
lawsuit = 
1
t test of 
difference
lawsuit = 
0
lawsuit = 
1
χ2 test of 
difference
currentmag –0.029 –0.050 2.4 
(0.01) 
–0.001 –0.011 22.0 
(0.00) 
laggedmag –0.028 –0.036 .9 
(0.67) 
0 0 6.3 
(0.01) 
R–1,1 –0.057 –0.250 15.5 
(0.00) 
–0.037 –0.226 96.1 
(0.00) 
R–127,–2 –0.075 –0.264 3.3 
(0.01) 
–0.167 –0.379 23.5 
(0.00) 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
 
Panel C: Pearson Correlations of Lawsuit with Explanatory Variables 
 
 lawsuit
current 0.10 
currentmag –0.08 
laggedmag  –0.03 
undoearngrow 0.19 
undoearnpos  0.15 
revenue 0.23 
nonumbers 0.35 
SEC  –0.07 
fraud 0.30 
R–1,1 –0.48 
R–127,–2 –0.12 
 
 
Notes: The sample is described in Table 1. The variables are defined and winsorization rules 
described in the notes to Table 2, except that lawsuit is an indicator variable for a class action 
lawsuit filed as a consequence of the restatement, and R–127,–2 is the buy-and-hold beta-adjusted 
return for the six months preceding the restatement announcement period window. Boldface 
highlights tests of differences across the no-lawsuit and lawsuit samples and correlations 
significant at the 5% level or better in a two-tailed test. In Panel C, the ξ2 test for differences of 
the medians of laggedmag across the two samples is nonzero and significant despite the identical 
medians for this variable because of the different proportion of observations with value equal to 
the median across the samples. 
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Table 7 
Predicting Class Action Lawsuits 
OLS and Logit Estimation 
Overall Sample 
 
.2,1271,1 −−+− ++
+++++
++++=
RR
fraudSECnonumbersrevenuesundoearnpo
owundoearngrlaggedmagcurrentmagcurrentlawsuit
preann
fsnrp
glcc
φφ
δδδδγ
γββαα
 (3) 
 
 OLS Logit Effect on 
probability
OLS Logit Effect on 
probability
Intercept (?) 0.094 
(.3) 
–2.849 
(–9.6) 
-- –0.027
(–0.8) 
–3.430 
(–10.2) 
-- 
current (?) 0.086 
(2.4) 
0.696 
(2.5) 
11.8% 0.078 
(2.3) 
0.700 
(2.4) 
10.9% 
currentmag (?) –0.142 
(–1.1) 
–0.771 
(–0.9) 
–13.0% 0.029 
(.2) 
0.403 
(0.5) 
6.3% 
laggedmag (?) 0.082 
(0.6) 
0.469 
(.5) 
7.9% 0.110 
(1.0) 
.532 
(0.5) 
8.3% 
undoearngrow (+) 0.141 
(3.1) 
0.774 
(2.8) 
13.1% 0.100 
(2.4) 
0.606 
(2.0) 
9.4% 
undoearnpos (+) 0.047 
(1.3) 
0.292 
(1.3) 
4.9% 0.016 
(0.5) 
0.163 
(0.6) 
2.5% 
revenue (+) 0.126 
(4.4) 
.775 
(4.2) 
13.1% 0.082 
(3.0) 
0.554 
(2.8) 
6.8% 
nonumbers (+) 0.234 
(7.6) 
1.312 
(7.0) 
22.1% 0.163 
(5.5) 
1.021 
(5.0) 
15.9% 
SEC (–) –0.035 
(–1.1) 
–0.247 
(–1.1) 
–4.2% 0.016 
(.5) 
0.227 
(0.9) 
3.5% 
fraud (+) 0.276 
(6.1) 
1.349 
(5.1) 
22.8% 0.193 
(4.5) 
1.041 
(3.7) 
16.2% 
R–1,1 (–) -- -- -- –0.854
(–10.6)
–5.385 
(–8.6) 
–83.8% 
R–127,–2 (–) -- -- -- –0.054
(–3.0) 
–0.467 
(–2.6) 
–7.3% 
R2 21.9% -- -- 32.0% -- -- 
model χ2 -- 100.9 (df=9) -- -- 190.3 (df=11) -- 
% correctly classified -- 78.3% -- -- 81.8% -- 
% no-lawsuit in sample -- 74.3% -- -- 74.3% -- 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
 
Notes: All regressions include 821 observations. The sample is described in Table 1. The 
variables are defined and winsorization rules described in the notes to Tables 2 and 5. Predictions 
for the sign of coefficients are indicated in parentheses next to the variable name. Student t 
statistics appear parenthetically beneath the estimated coefficients. Coefficients and model χ2 
values in the logit estimation appear in boldface if significant at the 5% level or better in a one-
tailed test if directional predictions are made and a two-tailed test otherwise. The logit estimation 
models the probability of a lawsuit. The “effect on probability” column to the right of the column 
reporting a given logit estimation indicates the marginal effect on the probability of a lawsuit 
implied by the coefficients from that estimation when the corresponding variable increases by 1. 
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Table 8 
Predicting Class Action Lawsuits 
Correct Prediction Percentages for Lawsuits and No-Lawsuit Observations 
Overall and Post-PSLRA Samples 
 
 
 
 
 overall sample with 
return variables
post-PSLRA sample with 
return variables
observations correctly classified 
(from Tables 6 and 8) 
81.8% 82.8% 
actual lawsuit is predicted to be 
lawsuit 
49.3% 61.2% 
actual no-lawsuit is predicted to be 
no-lawsuit 
93.0% 92.7% 
 
Note: These percentages are derived from the results of estimating equation (3) with the returns 
variables for the overall sample and the post-PSLRA sample reported in Tables 6 and 8.  
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Table 9 
Predicting Class Action Lawsuits 
OLS and Logit Estimation 
Post-PSLRA Sample 
 
.2,1271,1 −−+− ++
+++++
++++=
RR
fraudSECnonumbersrevenuesundoearnpo
owundoearngrlaggedmagcurrentmagcurrentlawsuit
preann
fsnrp
glcc
φφ
δδδδγ
γββαα
 (3) 
 
 OLS Logit Effect  
on prob.
OLS Logit Effect  
on prob.
Intercept (?) 0.040 
(.8) 
–2.620 
(–6.9) 
-- 0.014 
(0.3) 
–3.078 
(–7.4) 
-- 
current (?) 0.058 
(1.2) 
0.454 
(1.3) 
9.1% .036 
(.8) 
0.258 
(0.7) 
5.0% 
currentmag (?) –0.159 
(–0.8) 
–0.926 
(–0.9) 
–18.6% –0.011
(–0.1) 
0.320 
(0.3) 
6.2% 
laggedmag (?) 0.170 
(1.0) 
0.331 
(0.3) 
6.6% 0.170 
(1.1) 
0.118 
(0.1) 
2.3% 
undoearngrow (+) 0.233 
(3.8) 
1.370 
(3.7) 
27.5% 0.177 
(3.1) 
1.226 
(2.9) 
23.6% 
undoearnpos (+) 0.089 
(1.8) 
0.593 
(1.9) 
11.9% 0.051 
(1.1) 
0.444 
(1.3) 
8.6% 
revenue (+) 0.206 
(5.6) 
1.069 
(4.7) 
21.5% 0.132 
(3.9) 
0.845 
(3.4) 
16.3% 
nonumbers (+) 0.228 
(5.9) 
1.326 
(5.8) 
26.6% 0.171 
(4.8) 
1.104 
(4.4) 
21.3% 
SEC  (–) –0.052 
(–1.3) 
–0.339 
(–1.2) 
–6.8% 0.011 
(0.3) 
0.179 
(0.6) 
3.4% 
fraud (+) 0.323 
(5.8) 
1.779 
(5.1) 
35.7% 0.233 
(4.5) 
1.420 
(3.8) 
27.4% 
R–1,1 (–) -- -- -- –0.864
(–9.0) 
–5.809 
(–7.2) 
–112.1%
R–127,–2 (–) -- -- -- –0.054
(–2.8) 
–0.484 
(–3.1) 
–9.4% 
R2 29.1% -- -- 39.1% -- -- 
model chi–square -- 120.9 (df=9) -- -- 184.0 (df=11) -- 
% correctly classified -- 78.3% -- -- 82.8% -- 
% no lawsuit in sample -- 68.5% -- -- 68.5% -- 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
 
Notes: All regressions include the 540 observations for which the restatement announcement 
followed the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act on December 22, 1995. The 
overall sample is described in Table 1. The variables are defined and winsorization rules 
described in the notes to Tables 2 and 5. Predictions for the sign of coefficients are indicated in 
parentheses next to the variable name. Student t statistics appear parenthetically beneath the 
estimated coefficients. Coefficients and model χ2 values in the logit estimation appear in 
boldface if significant at the 5% level or better in a one-tailed test if directional predictions are 
made and a two-tailed test otherwise. The logit estimation models the probability of a lawsuit. 
The “effect on probability” column to the right of the column reporting a given logit estimation 
indicates the marginal effect on the probability of a lawsuit implied by the coefficients from that 
estimation when the corresponding variable increases by 1. 
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